Political threats to the Brazilian rainforest

Sergio Abranches
How can a supposedly communist legislator champion the interests of traditional landowners, and seek amnesty to illegal logging, often associated with violent land-grabbing and force-labor? The Brazilian House is right now discussing a bill proposing changes in the Forestry Code Law that does exactly that. The proposal under discussion was drafted by communist deputy Aldo Rebelo, a former Speaker of the House during President Lula’s first term in office.

The Forestry Code was instrumental in reducing deforestation rates. Deforestation although still not entirely sustainable has prevented the loss of a large amount of the Amazon forest. The proposal responds solely to the interests of the more traditional sector of the Brazilian agribusiness. Its main effect, if turned into law, would be to pardon illegal practices that led to deforestation and destruction of riparian vegetation that caused the erosion of river beds and drying of water sources. I’ve been to areas of soybean plantation where producers are desperate about water scarcity brought about by land clearing that destroyed all the previous vegetation, including the riverine, to increase agricultural area. Now rivers and sources are drying, and they’re left with no water for irrigation. In the future they’ll leave the land bare, and look for new areas to occupy pushing deforestation further into the Amazon and the savanna fields (Cerrado).

If approved, the proposal would do harm not only to the environment, but to the economic sustainability of competitive agricultural production in many areas. It benefits a traditional  mode of production that destroys the vegetal riparian protection of river banks and water sources; clears the vegetation that prevents landslides on steep hillsides; disregards the legal reserve of primary forest as a means to protect biodiversity. It is detrimental to a contemporary and competitive agricultural commodity business.

Large global buyers are banning all grain, beef and leather coming from land illegally cleared, or produced with the use of forced labor from their supply chains. In the Brazilian domestic market large retailers such as Walmart, Pão de Açúcar and Carrefour are also banning beef coming from areas of deforestation from their shelves. Major Brazilian exporters of leather goods will soon be forced to do the same.

The bill goes to the extreme of giving fiscal benefits to those who have illegally cleared their land and disrespected rules for the protection of riparian vegetation and primary biodiversity. Farmers who have obeyed all rules and paid a price for being legal will now see those who have thrived in illegality getting subsidized long-term finance to abide by far less demanding rules. Rules that will lead to the resumption of deforestation and destruction of river courses.

How can that happen? An alliance between a communist and the more conservative forces of the right linked to traditional rural practices of production and domination? How come the successors of the Brazilian latifundia can find political help from a supposedly left wing politician? How can a government led by a president who came from the progressive metalworkers union movement, leader of a labor-oriented party let such a bill follow its course unhindered? The government leadership is taking no action either to block or to modify a proposal that contradicts current government policies. It would, among other things, prevent the government from meeting the deforestation targets it has registered under the Copenhagen Accord. Several representatives of the Social-democrat opposition are also supporting the proposal or have adopted an attitude of benign neglect.

The Brazilian political system has some very specific features that help to explain such apparently surreal outcomes. Features that are hard to explain to foreign audiences.

Brazil has a presidential political system in which the President depends on a multiparty coalition to govern. I called it a ‘coalition presidential system’ a long time ago. It explains why president Lula is so uninterested on the fate of the Forestry Code. He has many traditional rural business sectors in his coalition that have a direct interest in changing the Code for their own benefit. The majority of the progressive forces in his coalition are not really interested in what happens to the distant Amazon region or the rich savanna fields of the Brazilian midwest.

Brazilian parties are two-headed entities, with a “national head” focused on presidential coalition politics, and a “regional head” focused on state and local politics. The Forestry Code is far more about regional and local interests than it is about general, strategic national issues. And this is also a measure of the little importance environmental issues have in the national political agenda. There is no place in the Brazilian party system for ideology or policy-oriented behavior. Parties are machines finely tuned to grabbing power and controlling the largest possible share of the national budget. All political dealings are led by the convenience of personalities, factions and their allies. Paramount among allies are business sectors that can provide resources to parties’ and politicians’ campaign finance; labor organizations that can provide loyal vote clusters; and organized sectoral lobbies controlling either money or vote pools.

Ideologies in this system are so fuzzy that ultra-right and ultra-left nationalists can easily coalesce to fight what they see as the perils of globalization. Retrograde business groups and opportunistic politicians who identify themselves as “progressive”, “communist”, or “socialist” can easily find common ground to justify their alliance. Ideological identifications are today no more than meaningless labels. That’s how a “communist” can staunchly defend the interests of landowners. Among the landowners to be benefitted there may be several who have had illegal or illegitimate access to land either by directly appropriating public land, or buying illegally grabbed land with fraudulent property documentation. Some of them are being prosecuted for the use of forced labor in their farms. The proposed version of the bill does not make any clear distinction between legitimate owners of legal land and land-grabbers.

The bill is presently at the stage of House committees review. After being voted at the House floor it has to be reviewed by the Senate. As we are approaching the campaign for general elections, including a presidential election, it is unlikely the bill could become law this year, under normal circumstances. Here lie the hopes of those who want to defend Brazilian forests and rivers: to obstruct the decision-making process and wait for the new correlation of forces that will come out of the elections. Seat turnover is likely to be very high this year: 100% of House seats and two thirds of the Senate seats are up for the grabs. Safe seats will be no more than 30% in the House. In other words only around 30% of the House are likely to get reelected. At least 60% of the Senate seats will change hands, a turnover of around 40%. Newcomers to the House can be as much as 50% of the total. We should also include in the renewal at least another 20% or 30% of seats that will likely be gained by former House members that did not run at the previous election or failed to get elected.

With the possibility of a power shift at the Presidency and a substantial change in party seat share in the Congress, the best strategy for those who oppose these changes to the Forestry Code should be to prevent the bill from being voted this year. The issues addressed by the bill will certainly be debated during the campaign and different points of view will become better known to the public. This would the best way to deal with the complexities and idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian political system.

The proposal responds solely to the interests of the more traditional sector of the Brazilian agribusiness. Its main effect, if turned into law, would be to pardon illegal practices that led to deforestation and destruction of riparian vegetation that caused the erosion of river beds and drying of water sources. I’ve been to areas of soybean plantation where producers are desperate about water scarcity brought about by land clearing that destroyed all the previous vegetation, including the riverine, to increase agricultural area. Now rivers and sources are drying, and they’re left with no water for irrigation. In the future they’ll leave the land bare, and look for new areas to occupy pushing deforestation further into the Amazon and the savanna fields (Cerrado).

The proposal does harm not only to the environment, but to the economic sustainability of competitive agricultural production in many areas. This mode of production destroys the vegetal riparian protection of river banks and water sources; clears the vegetation that prevents landslides on steep hillsides; disregards the legal reserve of primary forest as a means to protect biodiversity. It is detrimental to a contemporary and competitive agricultural commodity business. Large global buyers are banning all grain beef and leather coming from land illegally cleared, or produced with the use of forced labor from their supply chains. In the Brazilian domestic market large chains such as Walmart, Pão de Açúcar and Carrefour are also banning beef coming from areas of deforestation from their shelves. Major Brazilian exporters of leather goods will soon be forced to do the same.

The proposal goes to the extreme of giving fiscal benefits to those who have illegally cleared their land and disrespected rules for the protection of riparian vegetation and primary biodiversity. Farmers who have obeyed all rules and paid a price for being legal will now see those who have thrived in illegality getting subsidized long-term finance to abide by far less demanding rules. Rules that will lead to the resumption of deforestation and destruction of river courses.

How can that happen? An alliance between a communist and the more conservative forces of the right linked to traditional rural practices of production and domination? How come the successors of the Brazilian latifundia can find political help from a supposedly left wing politician? How can a government led by a president who came from the progressive metalworkers union movement, leader of a labor-oriented party let such a bill follow its course unhindered? The government leadership is taking no action either to block or to modify a proposal that runs against current government policies. It will, among other things, prevent the government from meeting the deforestation targets it has registered under the Copenhagen Accord. Several representatives of the Social-democrat opposition are also supporting the proposal or have adopted an attitude of benign neglect.

The Brazilian political system has some very specific features that help to explain such apparently surreal outcomes. Features that are hard to explain to foreign audiences.

Brazil has a presidential political system in which the President depends on a multiparty coalition to govern. I called it a ‘coalition presidential system’ a long time ago. It explains why president Lula is so uninterested on the fate of the Forestry Code. He has many traditional rural business sectors in his coalition that have a direct interest in changing the Code for their own benefit. The majority of the progressive forces in his coalition are not really interested in what happens to the distant Amazon region or the rich savanna fields of the Brazilian midwest.

Brazilian parties are two-headed entities, with a “national head” focused on presidential coalition politics, and a “regional head” focused on state and local politics. The Forestry Code is far more about regional and local interests than it is about general, strategic national issues. And this is also a measure of the little importance environmental issues have in the national political agenda. There is no place in the Brazilian party system for ideology or policy-oriented behavior. Parties are machines finely tuned to grabbing power offices and getting a fair share of the national budget. All political dealings are led by the convenience of personalities, factions and their allies. Paramount among allies are business sectors that can provide resources to parties’ and politicians’ campaign finance; labor organizations that can provide loyal vote clusters; and organized sectoral lobbies controlling either money or vote pools.

Ideologies in this system are so fuzzy that ultra-right and ultra-left nationalists can easily coalesce to fight what they see as the perils of globalization. Retrograde business groups and opportunistic politicians who identify themselves as “progressive”, “communist”, or “socialist” can easily find common ground to justify their alliance. Ideological identifications are today no more than meaningless labels. That’s how a “communist” can staunchly defend the interests of landowners. Among the landowners to be benefitted there may be several who have had illegal or illegitimate access to land either by directly appropriating public land, or buying illegally grabbed land with fraudulent property documentation. Some of them are being prosecuted for the use of forced labor in their farms. The proposed version of the bill does not make any clear distinction between legitimate owners of legal land and land-grabbers.

The proposal is presently under discussion by the House at the committee level. After being voted at the House floor it has to be reviewed by the Senate. As we are approaching the campaign for general elections, including a presidential election, it is unlikely the bill could become law this year, unless President Lula tells his leaders in Congress to give it urgency status. Here lies the hopes of those who want to defend Brazilian forests and rivers: to obstruct the decision-making process and wait for the new correlation of forcers that will come out of the elections. Seat turnover is likely to be very high this year: 100% of House seats and two thirds of the Senate seats are up for the grabs. Safe seats will be no more than 30% in the House. In other words only around 30% of the House are likely to get reelected. At least 60% of the Senate seats will change hands, a turnover of around 40%. Newcomers to the House can be as much as 50% of the total. We should also include in the renewal at least another 20% or 30% of seats that will likely be gained by former House members that did not run at the previous election or failed to get elected.

With the possibility of a power shift at the Presidency and a substantial change in party seat share in the Congress, the best strategy for those who oppose these changes to the Forestry Code should be to prevent the bill from being voted this year. The issues addressed by the bill will certainly be debated during the campaign and different points of view will become better known to the public. This should be the best way to deal with the complexities and idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian political system.

Tags: Amazon, Brazil, deforestation, rainforest