The development gap: a critical issue for a climate deal
Development disparities between rich and emerging nations have become the most critical issue on the way to a global climate deal in Copenhagen.
Development Gap as an issue
Development goals are inextricable from the domestic political infighting, and the argument that development is not equal to GDP growth has not yet gained the hearts and minds of the majority, neither globally, nor domestically. Denial from large emitters such as China and India, gives the rich nations an excuse not to take more stringent actions to curb carbon emissions unilaterally. Especially China’s emissions are often cited as a fact that turns any measure by other nations useless.
Yet, China, of the three critical emerging players is the one that is investing the most in clean energy and technologies, although refusing to adopt binding emissions targets. The Indian and Brazilian governments are far more reluctant, and their investment efforts relative to GDP lag far behind China’s. There is a simple and straightforward reason for China to be seen as the pivotal player among the emerging powers. Although doing far more than either Brazil or India, China is too big an emitter, and will continue to be for a long time. That’s why it is an easy pick to justify stalling any real deal. Denial by the three larger emerging powers (the BICs) becomes a justification for more general inaction.
India’s zigzag
Before the L’Aquila meeting, last July, India’s Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh has said that “India cannot and will not take emissions reduction targets because poverty eradication and social and economic development are first and over-riding priorities.” After the G8+5 meeting, and the visit from secretary Clinton to India, however, the Indian government has announced several new green initiatives (here, here, and here). Jairam Ramesh finally made public the official position regarding a climate deal in Copenhagen: a deal yes, but compulsory targets, no, at least for the next 10 years, here.
This stance coincides with proposals from the UK, as voiced, for instance, by Nicholas Stern, for India to commit now only to commit to emissions reductions targets by 2020. India Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, said that “it is India’s view, which has been consistently voiced at all forums, that global warming is taking place and that its adverse consequences will impact most heavily on developing countries like India”. This statement was made as a response to critics saying that India’s signing of the L’Aquila declaration saying global temperature increase should not exceed 2C would pave the way for the country to accept emission reduction targets at Copenhagen. The prime minister acknowledged it was the first time India had accepted a reference to the 2C threshold, but, he said, “this is entirely in line with our stated position on global warming. (…) Drawing attention to the seriousness of global warming does not automatically translate into a compulsion on the part of India or other developing countries represented in the Major Economic Forum to accept emission reduction obligations.” See the story here.
Although taking very cautious steps, India is starting to move towards a more cooperative role on climate change negotiations. It seems to be going the same way China is, both being ahead of Brazil.
I’ll discuss the Brazilian domestic politics on global climate change politics more in depth on another post.
Different frames of mind: different priorities on climate change
The social frame of mind about climate change, as well as the degree of sensitivity of governments to the social demands for action varies widely among the major political players at the climate summit.
The power shift in the US resulting from the election of President Obama represented leaving the “blockers” side, to take a leading role on the search for an effective climate agreement, joining the “enablers” side. That is happening apparently despite the fact that the US public does not seem to wish too hard the government to place a high priority on addressing climate change, at least for now.
A recent poll of 19 Nations by the World Public Opinion.org found that the mean response by US respondents saying they would wish the government to give higher priority to climate change was 4.71 out of a total of 10 points. The smaller average in the sample. In China, the mean response was 8.86 and, in India, 6.73. To have some parameter to compare the three: the mean response of the total sample was 7.33. So the US and India are below average, and China, above average.
If these figures mean anything at all, one could say that Obama is ahead of US public opinion on climate change as a priority, while the Chinese and Indian governments are far behind their citizens’ wishes.
When we look at the answers separating desired from perceived government priority on climate change, things become somewhat clearer. In the US, 52% say the government should have a higher priority on climate change, while 24% say it has already placed the right priority on climate change policy. Only 21% think that priority to climate change policy should be lower. In China, 62% would like the government to have a higher priority on global warming, versus 30% who think priority is at the right level. In India, only 43% wish a higher priority to climate change, and 24% say it is already at the right point. Those asking for a lower priority are 6% in China, and 18%, in India.
China: authoritarian governance and gradual progress
In China, there have been several reports of growing popular discontent with air and water pollution, and of agricultural regions facing heavy losses due to pollution, acid rain, and extreme climate events: see, for instance, The Epoch Times, Conscilience, People Daily, wsws.org, Reuters, Guardian, Daily Star, and China View. There have also been numerous verified stories of violent repression of attempts at mobilizing social discontent and on the political obstacles to environmental activism in China. The repression of the Uighur, in Xinjiang, was just the most recent one. Sources of stories and evidence of repression are, among others: Asia News, Amnesty.org reports on repression; a study published at Conservation and Society, on environmental activism and repression; a paper by Fengshi Wu, of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, on “Environmental Activism in China”; and Elizabeth Economy’s “China’s Flood Of Protests”, for Asia Media News Daily.
The highly hierarchical and authoritarian Chinese political system responds only to insider pressure, to the forces that belong to the tight power structure housed by the Communist Party of the People’s Republic. These forces are increasing in number with the economic transformations of the last decade or so. There is now an elite of influential business leaders. The personal power of both the President and the Premier is no longer as absolute as it was on Mao’s or Deng Xiaoping’s eras. Now, both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao are relatively accountable to a coalition joining two powerful and very distinct elite factions within the Chinese Communist Party, as Cheng Li, from the Brookings Institution argues. The “Elitist” faction consists of the “princelings, children of former high-ranking officials”, mostly technocrats, graduated in hi-tech areas, such as IT; and the “Populist” which has at its core former party bureaucrats who made it upwards the power structure through provincial leadership channels.
Most of the “populists” have worked in the poorest parts of the country before arriving at Beijing. Both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao belong to this group, according to Cheng Li. Differently from Deng and Jiang Zemin, who wanted growth at any cost, the new rulers, Wen particularly, are very much concerned with poverty, income redistribution, and environmental hazards.
Any observer of the Chinese political theater over the last 10 years has certainly noticed that environmental issues have moved a long way upwards the party-state hierarchy. Concerns with the environment have gone from the status of censored and repressed issues all the way up to the top of the political commanding heights. It now is the responsibility of one of the vice prime-ministers, but it is also explicitly and regularly addressed by prime-minister Wen Jiabao and president Hu Jintao.
While the US, under president Bush, remained on a state of denial, China didn’t have any incentive to move forward on foreign fora. Now, with the change of attitude by the Obama administration, the Chinese government seems to be waiting to see how far and how fast the US will go on climate change policy, before it commits itself.
Let’s make no mistake. China is no green hero. It continues to be a green villain. The point is: it is not alone, and there are emerging countries, like India and Brazil, with climate policies lagging behind China’s. China is moving, not at a pace proportional to the damage it causes to the planet, but at an apparently accelerating rate. It has already become a major player in the alternative energy markets.
India: a splinter democracy
India has a completely different political landscape when compared to either China or Brazil. A splinter society, it has a complex three tiered federal system of governance, and a multiparty system. It is changing from a dominant-party to a multiparty coalition-based governance system. Although the Congress Party has returned to its historical role of predominant party, after the last election, the era of one party dominance seems to have passed. Ethnical cleavages have been accommodated into the Federal system, reformed in the 1990’s to satisfy demands for more homogeneous cultural and linguistic federation borders. A mix of patronage, corruption, and decentralized governance still holds this mosaic together.
See, on patronage politics in India, the Special Report by The Times of India. Sources on corruption are Jon S. T. Quah’s paper at the Asian Journal of Political Science, Gurharpal Singh’s paper for the European Institute for Asian Studies, and Robert Wade’s study on Canal Irrigation.
Additionally a system of expansion and contraction of ethnic strife has been clearly related to the degree of legitimacy and national influence of the central government. Any decision about the path to be taken by the economy and about the dynamics of growth has to be cleared through this many-tiered structure of power. Although the central government tightly controls decision-making power on macro-strategic issues such as climate change and national security, its capability to impose a decision that may be seen as sacrificing growth prospects at the local and state levels is limited. Growth, as it is now known and perceived, is the minimum common denominator that holds the power system together and assures both some social peace and the Nation-state’s integrity.
Ian McDonald’s sci-fi novel, River of Gods, sees a future India where the most powerful states become independent nations and are usually in conflict with each other. A scenario that seems plausible when one looks closely at the fragile balance that holds the national system together.
The role of development ideologies
In closed regimes, like the Chinese, ideology plays a greater role, than in emerging democracies, like Brazil or India. The government is far less sensitive to public opinion and tends to suppress activism. At the same time, it is easier for the Chinese elite to act against the ‘development’ demands of groups with a vested interest on the high-carbon, high-growth status quo, when and if it is persuaded that a low-carbon economy would best serve the future interests of the country. Of the three, China is by far the one with a better record of long-range planning and policy.
In India, the resistance of strong (and wealthier) high-carbon economic vested interests is increased by the fear from the political leadership at all tiers of political power that the change would trigger the uprising of the impoverished masses. Development, as GDP growth, and reproducing the path developed nations have taken, becomes a fundamental elite legitimation mechanism in a very unequal and divided society. Although the caste systems continues to be pervasive, it has been increasingly contested in recent years. The caste system has been extremely powerful as a tool for cultural and religious domination and to nurture conformism, but it is showing signs of exhaustion. Economic performance becomes the critical resource to manage potential conflicts and cleavages.
To China and India, the transition to a low-carbon economy would cost more because of their dependency on coal for energy. In Brazil, for instance, the electric matrix is based on hydropower, while the wind, wave, photovoltaic, and biomass huge potential remains largely untapped.
These contradictions among unequal members of the high-carbon club, may well prevent a broader and more effective climate deal to emerge from the talks leading to the Copenhagen diplomatic wrap up. We don’t have much time, but we will have some time left to work towards a broader and ambitious deal, beyond Copenhagen.
Copenhagen’s COP-15 will, nevertheless, be a historic one. It will mark the day the United States took a leading role on global climate politics, and it also will unveil this divide within the high-emitters club, between mature economies and emerging ones. The US will no longer be playing the role of a hegemonic veto power, blurring this divide, as it did during the Bush administration. That might seem a bad thing, a revival of the old “North-South” split, but it is not so. It actually represents a new stage for the parcelling out of the climate quandary.
The removal of the US veto is a major step towards a global climate understanding. Australia has already moved from a state of denial to a cooperative stance. Canada is gradually abandoning the reactionary climate position it held until recently.
The next step will be to deal with the technological, financial and political requisites to bring the “three big” emerging club partners into a new green deal.
Tags: China, Climate Change, COP15, development, economy, Global climate politics, India